Autonomy is a hallmark of animal intelligence, enabling adaptive and intelligent behavior in complex environments without relying on external reward or task structure. Existing reinforcement learning approaches to exploration in reward-free environments, including a class of methods known as model-based intrinsic motivation, exhibit inconsistent exploration patterns and do not converge to an exploratory policy, thus failing to capture robust autonomous behaviors observed in animals. Moreover, systems neuroscience has largely overlooked the neural basis of autonomy, focusing instead on experimental paradigms where animals are motivated by external reward rather than engaging in ethological, naturalistic and task-independent behavior. To bridge these gaps, we introduce a novel model-based intrinsic drive explicitly designed after the principles of autonomous exploration in animals. Our method (3M-Progress) achieves animal-like exploration by tracking divergence between an online world model and a fixed prior learned from an ecological niche. To the best of our knowledge, we introduce the first autonomous embodied agent that predicts brain data entirely from self-supervised optimization of an intrinsic goal -- without any behavioral or neural training data -- demonstrating that 3M-Progress agents capture the explainable variance in behavioral patterns and whole-brain neural-glial dynamics recorded from autonomously behaving larval zebrafish, thereby providing the first goal-driven, population-level model of neural-glial computation. Our findings establish a computational framework connecting model-based intrinsic motivation to naturalistic behavior, providing a foundation for building artificial agents with animal-like autonomy.

"true" quantity we want to estimate

What makes an artificial system a good model of intelligence? The classical test proposed by Alan Turing focuses on behavior, requiring that an artificial agent's behavior be indistinguishable from that of a human. While behavioral similarity provides a strong starting point, two systems with very different internal representations can produce the same outputs. Thus, in modeling biological intelligence, the field of NeuroAI often aims to go beyond behavioral similarity and achieve representational convergence between a model's activations and the measured activity of a biological system. This position paper argues that the standard definition of the Turing Test is incomplete for NeuroAI, and proposes a stronger framework called the ``NeuroAI Turing Test'', a benchmark that extends beyond behavior alone and \emph{additionally} requires models to produce internal neural representations that are empirically indistinguishable from those of a brain up to measured individual variability, i.e. the differences between a computational model and the brain is no more than the difference between one brain and another brain. While the brain is not necessarily the ceiling of intelligence, it remains the only universally agreed-upon example, making it a natural reference point for evaluating computational models. By proposing this framework, we aim to shift the discourse from loosely defined notions of brain inspiration to a systematic and testable standard centered on both behavior and internal representations, providing a clear benchmark for neuroscientific modeling and AI development.